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Abstract 
New production technologies, consumers who are more discriminating, and the need 
for improved coordination are among the forces driving the move from spot markets to 
contracts. Some worry that this tendency will result in the disappearance of spot markets, 
or at least that they will become too thin to be of help for an efficient price discovery 
process. Other authors point to the reduction in welfare of independent producers 
resulting from contracting in oligopsonistic industries. While a large body of literature is 
available tackling the contract versus spot market decision, much less is known about the 
reasons that lead to procurement in both markets. This paper provides a simple model to 
study how fundamental economic factors influence the contracting behavior of farmers 
and processors. In the model, processors contract upstream with price-taking farmers. 
Participation in both markets arises as a Nash equilibrium for a wide range of 
parameterizations. Numerical methods are used to examine the effects of fundamental 
economic factors on the relative size of the spot and contract markets.   
 
Keywords:  contract markets, contracting in agriculture, specialty grains, spot markets, 
yield risk. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CAN SPOT AND CONTRACT MARKETS CO-EXIST IN AGRICULTURE? 
Introduction 
A growing proportion of agricultural production is being raised and sold under 
contract arrangements. The literature is rich in reasons for the increasing use of contracts 
(see, for example, Barkema 1993; Drabenstott 1994; Dimitri and Jeaenicke 2001; 
Featherstone and Sherrick 1992; Sykuta and Parcell 2003; Hennessy 1996; Hueth and 
Ligon 1999; Hennessy and Lawrence 1999). The move to production under contracts has 
some concerned about the viability of remaining spot markets and about the degree to 
which farmer welfare is negatively impacted by market power of processors (Smith 
2001; Hayenga, Schroeder, and Lawrence 2002).  
While a lot of research has been devoted to the spot market versus contracts 
question (starting with the work of Coase [1937]), much less is known about the 
motivations that lead to the co-existence of both spot and contract markets. It is 
somewhat surprising that agricultural economists have not explored the rationales for 
co-existence thoroughly, since many important sectors exhibit this feature.1 The first 
paper that explicitly models co-existence of spot and contract markets in agriculture is 
by Xia and Sexton (2004).2 The point made by these authors is that “top-of-the-market-
pricing” (TOMP) clauses in cattle procurement result in reduced competition, when 
buyers can also influence the base price. The intuition is that as buyers have committed 
to buy output at a price tied to a spot price to be determined later on, they have 
incentives to compete less aggressively in that market. In their setting, because of 
externalities or coordination problems among themselves, sellers can be induced to sign 
contracts that are not in their collective best interest with little or no financial incentive. 
In this paper, we study how fundamental economic factors (prices, production 
variability, competitive environment, and costs) influence the relative profitability of 
contract and spot production for farmers and processors. Our objective is to gain insight 
into how these factors help determine the incentives for participation in contract and spot 
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markets. For the sake of concreteness, this article focuses on the co-existence of spot and 
contract markets in the context of specialty grain production. However, the economic 
forces at work apply broadly (to any industry in which the same group of buyers and sellers 
participate in spot and contract markets and the buying side is concentrated). 
 
Specialty Grain Production and Marketing 
Increasing proportions of agricultural products being produced and sold under 
contracts have been reported not only on livestock (Lawrence and Hayenga 2002; 
Hayenga et al. 2000) and fruits and vegetables, but also on some grains and oilseeds. 
For example, the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS 2003) reports that 10.4 
percent of all U.S. corn production, 8.6 percent of the soybeans, and 4.8 percent of the 
wheat was sold through marketing contracts in 2001. The value of the three crops 
marketed under contracts was about $2.25 billion, $1.25 billion, and $0.25 billion for 
corn, soybeans, and wheat, respectively. However, the proportion of specialty grains 
and oilseeds planted under contracts is much larger. Just to mention a few examples, 
the U.S. Grain Council (2001) reports that about 60-70 percent of waxy corn and 60-65 
percent of white corn are grown under contract, with the remaining area produced 
speculatively for the spot market. The interest in planting and marketing specialty corn 
and soybeans is growing (Good, Bender, and Lowell 2000). These authors conducted a 
survey of grain handling firms in Illinois. In 1998, these firms obtained 85 percent, 87 
percent, 59 percent, and 96 percent of the volumes handled of high oil, white, yellow 
food grade, and waxy corn, respectively, from contracts with farmers. The remaining 
product was procured mostly through spot markets. For soybeans, the surveyed firms 
reported that 97 percent, 80 percent, and 85 percent of the volumes handled of STS 
(Dupont herbicide-tolerant), tofu, and non-GMO soybeans, respectively, were obtained 
through contracts with farmers. Thus, the firms surveyed procure most of the input (for 
both types of crops) through contracts, using existing spot markets as residual suppliers. 
Marketing contracts are most often used for procurement (NASS 2003; Boland et 
al. 1999). The market price plus a premium accounted for 60 percent of the contracts 
reported in a survey of specialty corn producers conducted by Ginder et al. (2000). A 
premium is paid over a reference price (yellow no. 2 corn), conditional on the crop 
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meeting certain quality specifications. Yield drags, higher variable costs of production 
(especially transportation and handling), and additional management time required are 
among the reasons that producers command premiums to plant specialty crops (Fulton, 
Pritchett, and Pederson 2003).3  
The situation modeled in this paper is similar to that in Xia and Sexton 2004 in the 
sense that we model an oligopsonistic industry that contracts with upstream, price-
taking input providers, and the market for processed products (downstream) is perfectly 
competitive. The TOMP clause is also assumed to be used in our model. However, we 
depart from this setting by modeling a situation where the pricing arrangement 
embedded in the contract is not affected by the behavior of buyers in the spot market. 
That is, buyers do not have power in the market to influence the reference price to 
which the contract price is pegged,4 although they can influence price in the cash-
market for the commodity procured. Four other distinctive features of our model are as 
follows: (a) we assume a harsher type of competition (in prices) in the spot market; (b) 
we include uncertainty as a factor inherent in agricultural activity; (c) we recognize that 
at any given point in time or growing season, there is only so much of a homogeneous 
output coming from a fixed pool of producers (i.e., supply in the cash market is fixed, 
influenced by decisions made possibly months in advance5); and (d) processors are 
constrained in the amount of the agricultural produce they can process at any point in 
time. There are concessions, of course, that one has to make to model a more realistic 
setting. First, we lose some tractability, in the sense that we are not able to obtain 
analytic solutions for some cases. Second, an ad hoc assumption is needed to close the 
model in one of the possible scenarios (more on this to follow). 
The situation we examine is fairly typical in agriculture. Processors offer farmers 
contracts to purchase all production on a specified number of acres at a price pegged to a 
yet-to-be-realized market price. In other words, the pricing arrangement embedded in the 
contract is TOMP, or “market price plus a premium.”6 Each processor has a target 
amount of production to procure. Procurement in excess of this target—for example, 
when per-acre yields are very high—can be sold at some salvage price, which is assumed 
throughout to be the commodity price for the product. When contract supply is low, the 
processor can turn to the spot market to make up the difference, but only if farmers have 
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planted for the spot market. The price in the spot market clears the ex post (after random 
yields are realized) processor demand with the fixed supply of the product. Thus, 
stochastic yields lead to stochastic spot market prices. We account for such economic 
factors as the price the processor receives for output, salvage values of excess supply for 
the processor and the farmer, the farm-level cost of production, the number of farmers 
and processors, and the amount of yield variability. We find that purely financial reasons 
can explain the preference of contract and/or spot market procurement. 
We begin by providing an overview of the problem to be addressed here and then 
present a formal presentation of a model that captures the profit incentives of processors 
and farmers. Numerical simulations show how the Nash solution reacts to changes in key 
economic parameters. These simulation results allow us to determine the key factors 
affecting the preference of farmers and processors for contract and spot production.  
 
Overview of the Problem 
Suppose there are M input buyers (processors) in a geographic region who can enter 
into grower contracts that specify that the processor will purchase at a guaranteed 
premium over a yet to be determined market price all the production that comes off of 
contracted acres. There are N growers. Each of the M processors has a capacity constraint 
Q that limits the amount of delivered input that can be used.7 Output technology for the 
processor is a fixed proportions technology ( )sc xyAkq += , where q is output, cA  is 
acreage contracted by each processor, sx  is the amount bought on the spot market, and y 
is the per-acre yield on all spot and contract acres in a given year.8 At no additional cost 
of generality, the conversion factor between raw input and output k  is set to one (by 
choosing units of measurement appropriately). A problem arises because per-acre yield 
on the contract acres is stochastic so that the total quantity of produced input from 
contracted acres will vary from the amount needed by the processor to achieve capacity 
production. Any excess production can be sold by the processor for a salvage price. 
Farmers have the option to plant additional acres of production without a contract. The 
amount of production depends on the expected spot price they will receive.  
The ex post input price in the spot market equals the commodity price if there is excess 
supply of the input. If, ex post, there is excess demand of the input in the spot market, then 
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the spot price of the input (given that there are sufficient buyers) will be bid up to the point 
where profits for the processors equal zero. Under certain excess demand conditions, there 
is no equilibrium price that can be obtained. That is, there is no general solution to the 
problem of a limited number of buyers bidding for a fixed supply of the input. To get 
around this problem, we assume, for now, that the spot price in such excess demand 
conditions is midway between the excess demand and the excess supply prices.  
The processor offers to identical risk-neutral farmers a premium, δ , and a total 
number of contract acres, cA . If this contract price exceeds or meets the opportunity cost 
of land, then the processor will find an excess demand for the contract acres and will not 
have a problem finding takers for the contracts. We assume throughout that farmers will 
not plant for the spot market if they know they will be obtaining the commodity price for 
their output.9 The processor’s capacity constraint and the number of contract acres 
determines the probability that production will be less than that needed to run at capacity. 
This creates the possibility that the processor will find it profitable to buy in the spot 
market. If this probability is high enough, this creates an incentive for farmers to produce 
for the spot market.  
The processor can control the profitability of farmers growing for the spot market 
through the choice of cA . That is, increases in cA  decrease the profitability because there 
will be less total spot demand. There is a spot market supply curve sA  = g(Ac) 
with 0<
cA
g  that captures farmers’ willingness to plant for the spot market.  
Then, each processor i  has a demand for contract acreage function that results from 
the profit-maximization problem that depends on the number of spot acres and the 
number of acres contracted by its rivals: ( ), , ,c i c i sA h A A−= . Vector ,c iA −  contains the 
acreage contracted by other processors in the industry. Presumably, 
,
0
c iA
h − < ; 0sAh <  
because an increase in the demand for contracted acres by the processor’s rivals increases 
the premium required to entice farmers to take contracts, and increases in spot market 
acreage decrease the payoff from additional contract acres. All of this is common 
knowledge for both farmers and processors. 
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Farmers and processors face a two-stage optimization problem. In the first stage 
processors decide simultaneously and independently the premium to pay for the input and 
how many contract acres to offer. The farmer’s choices are whether to take the contracts 
offered and how many acres to plant for the spot market. Contracts cannot be reoffered. 
Both decisionmakers face spot price uncertainty caused by supply uncertainty from 
random yields. They would also face uncertainty in the contract price, since the premium 
is tied to a yet-to-be-determined cash price, and premiums usually reflect quality 
differences. To keep things simple, however, we assume that the reference price and 
quality are fixed at their expected value. In the second stage, processors compete to buy 
the input they need if it turns out that the contracted input is not enough to work at 
capacity. The optimization problem is solved using backward induction. The next section 
formalizes the problem described so far. First, we analyze the optimization problem of 
processors; then, we analyze the problem farmers face.  
 
The Model 
The Processor Problem 
The second stage of the processor problem occurs after harvest, so yield uncer-
tainty has been resolved. Ex post, processors face a perfectly inelastic supply of the 
homogeneous input, given by the total acres planted for the spot market multiplied by 
its yield.  
After observing yield y, processors decide whether or not to try to buy more input. 
The second-stage (ex post) demand for each processor is ( )s cx Q A y= − ,10 which can be 
negative if it turns out that the processors get more input than they need. 
The price in the spot market, and hence the allocation of the rent among farmers and 
processors, will depend on the ex post relative “bargaining” power. Spot price is 
determined by demand and supply in the spot market, both of which are determined by 
planting and contracting decisions made in the first period. In this stage, processors bid 
simultaneously and independently to purchase the amount of input they need (if any) to 
work at capacity. Processors are engaging in a Bertrand type of competition with each 
other. After seeing the bids of each processor, farmers decide whether to sell their 
production to one of the processors (and to which one) or not to sell at all and obtain the 
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salvage value for the production. For the allocation of the input, we assume that farmers 
will sell it first to the processor offering the highest price. This processor is able to buy all 
the input he or she needs (if less than the aggregate supply); then, farmers offer the input 
remaining to the second-highest bid, and so on. In case of a tie, the input is distributed 
evenly across processors (in the cases where there is excess demand). In short, we are 
using a “highest offer first” allocation rule (see Weninger and Reinhorn n.d., and endnote 
18).  
Ex post, processors will find themselves in one of four possible scenarios regarding 
their demand for additional production. The first scenario examined is when yields are 
high enough so that processors exceed their capacity constraint with contracted 
production. This occurs when 
c
Qy
A
≥ . Any surplus production on contract acres will be 
sold at the going salvage or commodity price. In this case, profits for the processor are 
( ) ( )1 1 1c cpQ r A y r Q A yπ δ= − + − − , 
or 
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1c cp r A y p r Q A yπ δ= − + + − −  
where p is the price of output (net of processing costs)11, and 1r δ+  is the per-unit price 
of contracted acreage. Here, ( ) 0s cx Q A y= − ≤ , and the firm is getting some money back 
for the excess input. Note, however, that processors lose money on each bushel 
contracted in excess of their target. They would have contracted less acres had they 
known that such a realization of y  was going to occur. This situation happens with 
probability Pr( ) Pr( ) 1 ( )
c
Qy y v F v
A
≥ = ≥ = − , where 
c
Qv
A
= , and )(⋅F is the cumulative 
distribution function of yield. 
The second scenario occurs when ex post demand by processors is positive but there 
is still excess supply in aggregate. That is, 
1
( )M ci si Q A y A y= − ≤∑ , where sA  is total 
acreage planted for the spot market by all farmers. Thus yAs  is ex post aggregate, fixed 
supply in the spot market. The range of yields for this situation is given by  
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( )1M cs cii
MQ Qy
AA A=
≤ ≤
+∑ . 
Because there is still aggregate excess supply, an offer by processors of 1sr r=  for spot 
production (where 1r  is the salvage value for spot production) constitutes a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium.12 This is what Sexton and Zhang (1996) observed in the market for 
California iceberg lettuce.13 Processors do not need to bid the price up to get all the input 
they need to work at capacity.  
Again processors can work at capacity, and profits are 
( ) ( )2 1 1c cpQ r A y r Q A yπ δ= − + − − , 
or 
( )( ) ( )( )2 1 1c cp r A y p r Q A yπ δ= − + + − − . 
This case happens with probability  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1Pr PrM cs cii
MQ Qy u y v F v F u
AA A=
  ≤ ≤ = ≤ ≤ = − +  ∑
, 
where v is defined as above, and ( )1Ms cii
MQu
A A=
=
+∑ . 
The third scenario is when there is excess demand ex post but only one processor 
would not have enough production to run at capacity. One would think that in an excess 
demand condition, processors would bid up the spot price to the point in which all their 
rents are dissipated. But if only one processor does not have enough input to run at 
capacity, then there is an incentive for this processor to strategically underbid its rivals 
for the residual supply. This is the case in which a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies 
fails, in general, to exist.14 Edgeworth cycles may arise in this case (following a loose 
dynamic argument). For example, the price may rise as the processors try to increase their 
share in the input market, until the profit of doing so is lower than the one resulting from 
offering the reservation price of the farmers (or commodity price) and keeping the 
residual supply. Once the price is at the reservation price of the farmers (or low enough), 
processors will find it profitable to bid ε above their rivals and work at capacity.  
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This case implies ( )( ) ( )11 1
1
M M
s ci s ci i
M Q MQy
A A A A−= =
− ≤ ≤
+ +∑ ∑ . Because we are assuming a 
symmetric solution in which processors get an even distribution of the fixed supply (i.e., 
each processor is able to buy 
M
yAs in the spot market), processors will not be able to work 
at capacity. Profits in this case are 
( )( ) ( )3 1 sc s Ap r A y p r yMπ δ= − + + − , 
where rs is the resulting input price in the spot market. 
In this case we cannot know with certainty what rs will be. The Nash equilibrium for 
this situation will be in mixed strategies, implying that the payoff function will not be 
continuous.15 To close the model, we set it equal to the average of the marginal 
valuations of the processors and the farmers. This case happens with probability 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 1
1
Pr Pr
M M
s ci s cii i
M Q MQy s y u F u F s
A A A A−= =
 − ≤ ≤ = ≤ ≤ = − + +  ∑ ∑
,  
where u is defined as above and ( )( )11
1
M
s cii
M Q
s
A A−=
−=
+∑ . 
The fourth and final scenario is when yield is so low (given the areas contracted and 
planted for the spot) that at least one processor would be left out of the market if that 
processor tries to underbid his or her rivals. For example, the second-to-last processor 
finds some supply but it is not enough to work at capacity. In this case, there is no room 
for strategic underbidding by the last processor. If the last processor tries to underbid his 
or her rivals, that processor will be left out of the market. This will happen if 
( )11M ci si Q A y A y−= − ≥∑ , or, equivalently, ( )( )11
1
M
s cii
M Q
y
A A−=
−≤
+∑ . The pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium here is for processors to offer their marginal valuation ( )p  for the input. 
Processors will again split the input evenly and will not be able to work at capacity. 
Profits in this case are 
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( ) ( )( )4 1 1s sc c cA y A ypA y p r A y p p r A yM Mπ δ δ= + − + − = − + . 
. 
This will occur with probability  
( )( ) ( ) ( )11
1
Pr Pr
M
s cii
M Q
y y s F s
A A−=
 − ≤ = ≤ = +  ∑
 
where s is defined as above. 
Processor Expected Profits 
Now we are ready to write the first-stage objective function of a representative 
processor. Bearing the rules that will arise in the second stage in mind, processors 
independently and simultaneously make a decision as to how many contracts to offer and 
price premiums to pay in order to maximize their expected payoff. That is, each processor 
chooses Aci and δ  to maximize its expected profits, which are defined as 
  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )
, 1 1
1 1
1
, Pr
( ) / 2 Pr
Pr
i c i s ci ci
s
ci
ci
E A A E p r A y p r Q A y u y y u
AE p r A y p p r y s y u s y u
M
E p r A y s y y s
π δ
δ
δ
− = − + + − − ≤ ≥
 + − + + − + ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
+ − + ≤ ≤
 
subject to the constraint that the contracts need to be accepted by farmers. This objective 
function can be rewritten as follows: 
( ) ( ), 1
0
, ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( )
2
u u
s
i c i s ci ci
s
AE A A p r A ydF y Q F u ydF y A E y
M
π δ−  = − + − + −  ∫ ∫   (1) 
where ( )yf , myy ≤≤0  is the density function for the random yield and ( )yE  is the 
expected value of the yield. Formally, the problem is 
 ( ),0, 0max ,ci i c i sA E A Aδ π −≥ ≥  
subject to  
 ( )1 ( ) '( )s cr E y C a aδ+ ≥ + . 
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The marginal cost for farmers of planting an acre of the crop is '( )s cC a a+ . The number 
of acres planted for the cash market and contract market by a farmer are sa  and ca , 
respectively. The farmer’s problem will be presented subsequently. The constraint 
indicates that the expected marginal revenue of a contracted acre cannot be lower than the 
marginal cost of planting that extra acre. In other words, the premium and number of 
acres offered to a farmer have to be consistent with his or her supply schedule if the 
contract is going to be accepted.16 The constraint has to be binding at any optimum for 
this problem (if any positive number of contracts is offered). Otherwise, processors can 
reduce the financial incentive offered and still entice acceptance of the contracts by 
farmers. This observation allows us to subsume the constraint into the objective function 
and perform the optimization only with respect to the number of contracts offered.17  
The first-order condition for a maximum is found by differentiating equation (1) with 
respect to Ac using the Leibnitz rule. After imposing symmetry and using some algebra, 
we get 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
3 3
,
1
0
,
( ) 0
2 1
u
c i s s c
ci
ci c ci
E A A f u u f s sA ap r ydF y E y A
A MQ M M a A
π δ δ−∂     ∂∂= − + + − + ≤      ∂ − ∂ ∂   ∫  (2) 
with equality if 0ciA > , 1,...,i M= . Second-order sufficient conditions are presented in 
the Appendix.  
Processors take into account that they can affect the probability of being in each of 
the situations described. They realize, for example, that if they increase the contracted 
area, it is less likely that they will have to buy in the spot market. Of course, the 
magnitude of the marginal effect each processor has decreases as the number of 
processors increases. Before exploring the ramifications of this assumption, we will first 
examine the problem of farmers. 
Farmer Decisions 
Farmers have rational expectations, share common beliefs, and take contract area and 
contract price as given in solving their optimization problem. They decide whether to 
take a processor’s offer of acreage and price or whether to plant for the spot market. If 
they are indifferent between taking and rejecting the contracts, they are assumed to accept 
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the processors offer.18 Assume a large number N of identical farmers. The large number 
assumption is not crucial. The important assumption is that farmers take prices and 
aggregate acreages as given. Thus, they do not act as if they can affect the probability of 
ex post spot market demand. Here, cja is the acreage contracted by farmer j, sja  is the area 
planted for the spot market by farmer j, and ( )cj sjC a a+  is the cost of production. 
Because it is assumed that farmers are identical, the subscript j will be dropped. The 
expected profit of a farmer thus can be written as  
( ) ( ) ( )( )1F c s s c sE E r a y r a y C a aπ δ= + + − + . 
Again, four different scenarios may arise in the spot market. These scenarios are the 
same as the ones described in the processor problem and for that reason we will only state 
here what farmers expect, that is, their payoff function and their probability of being in 
each scenario. In the first scenario, there is no demand in the spot market. Here, farmers 
do not receive any bid for their output and therefore the value of the crop equals the 
commodity price. The profit function for this scenario is  
( ) ( )1 1 1F c s c sr a y r a y C a aπ δ= + + − + , 
which, as before, occurs with probability ( ) ( )Pr Pr 1
c
Qy y v F v
A
 ≥ = ≥ = −  
.  
In the second scenario, there is demand for the input in the spot market. However, 
aggregate supply exceeds aggregate demand. Profits and probability of occurrence for 
this scenario are  
( ) ( )2 1 1F c s c sr a y r a y C a aπ δ= + + − +  
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1Pr PrM cis cii
MQ Qy u y v F v F u
AA A=
  ≤ ≤ = ≤ ≤ = − +  ∑
. 
The third scenario corresponds to the one where only (M – 1) processors can work at 
capacity. Farmer profits and probability of occurrence for this scenario are  
( ) ( )3 1F c s s c sr a y r a y C a aπ δ= + + − +  
and 
Can Spot and Contract Markets Co-Exist in Agriculture? / 15 
 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 1
1
Pr Pr
M M
s ci s cii i
M Q MQy s y u F u F s
A A A A−= =
 − ≤ ≤ = ≤ ≤ = − + +  ∑ ∑
. 
And the last scenario is as before, where at least one processor would be left out of the 
market if that processor tries to underbid his or her  rivals so that the spot price is bid up to 
(p), the processor’s marginal valuation for the input. Profits and probability of occurrence 
for this case are 
( ) ( )4 1F c s c sr a y pa y C a aπ δ= + + − +   
and 
( )( ) ( ) ( )11
1
Pr Pr
M
s cii
M Q
y y s F s
A A−=
 − ≤ = ≤ = +  ∑
. 
Now we can write the expected profit of farmers as  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 0( )my u sF c s s c su sE r a E y a r yf y dy r yf y dy pydy C a aπ δ= + + + + − +∫ ∫ ∫ . (3) 
The first-order condition for a maximum is obtained by differentiating equation (3) 
with respect to sa :  
  
( ) ( )1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ' 0m
F
y u s
s c su s
s
E
r yf y dy r y f y dy p yf y dy C a a
a
π∂ = + + − + ≤∂ ∫ ∫ ∫ ,  (4) 
with equality if 0>sa . Second-order conditions trivially hold for any convex cost 
function. 
Note that farmers take the aggregate amount planted for the spot as given. Hence, we 
do not use the Leibnitz rule here. Farmers do not realize they can change the probability 
of being in the scenarios described (they take sA  as given). This is because individual 
farmer output is assumed to be too small to affect the aggregate spot supply. Recall that 
farmers are assumed to have rational expectations. Farmers believe the aggregate acreage 
for the spot will be sA , and in equilibrium their expectations are realized.  
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Equilibrium 
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium acreages for both the farmer and 
processor problems. An equilibrium for this model, is conformed by two main 
components corresponding to the processor’s and farmer’s problem. A pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium for the processor’s game is a number of contracted acres *ciA , 1,...,i M=  such 
that no processor can benefit from unilateral deviations, for a given number of acres 
planted for the spot market. That is to say that in equilibrium, a processor cannot increase 
its profit by unilaterally choosing to contract a different number of acres. Farmers take 
the number of contract acres and the price offered as given, and, based also on their 
beliefs regarding the aggregate spot acreage, they choose the number of acres to plant for 
the spot market in order to maximize profits. It cannot be overemphasized that farmers’ 
decisions are the result of an optimization problem and do not arise from strategic 
interactions with processors or other farmers. However, the discussion will proceed as if 
farmers were “reacting” optimally to processors’ offers, and Nash equilibrium will be 
used in a loose way to refer to the equilibrium of the model. 
Three additional conditions have to hold in equilibrium. First, beliefs regarding 
aggregate spot acreage are confirmed: ss NaA = . Second, aggregate demand and supply 
for contracts are equalized: cc MANa = . Finally, farmers’ profits are nonnegative. In 
short, any equilibrium has to satisfy equations (5) and (6), which obtain from imposing 
the equilibrium conditions to equations (2) and (4), respectively: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
3 3
1 0
( ) 0
2 1
u s c
ci
c ci
f u u f s sA ap r ydF y E y A
MQ M M a A
δ δ    ∂∂− + + − + ≤      − ∂ ∂   ∫ , (5) 
with equality if 0>cA ; 
  1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ' 0
my u s
s c su s
Mr yf y dy r y f y dy p yf y dy C A a
N
 + + − + ≤  ∫ ∫ ∫ ,  
with equality if 0>sa , for 
c
Qv
A
= , ( )s c
MQu
Na MA
= + , 
( )
( )( )
1
1s c
M Q
s
Na M A
−= + − ,  (6) 
and equation (3) 0≥ . 
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The equilibrium for a particular environment can be predicted using the best-
response functions of processors, ( )ci sA h A= , and farmers, ( )sj ca z A=  (for 
( ) ( ) NAgAz cc /= ),19 as previously introduced in the problem overview section. These 
functions are defined implicitly by equations (5) and (6), respectively. The equilibrium is 
determined by the intersection of the best-response functions or, equivalently, by solving 
equations (5) and (6) simultaneously for *cA  and 
*
sja . Unfortunately, we cannot obtain 
closed solutions for this model. However, numeric techniques can be used to characterize 
the predicted Nash equilibrium as well as responses to changes in the environment. In 
what follows, we provide a characterization of the equilibrium for a particular calibration 
of the model (hereupon referred to as the benchmark case). The parameter values 
assumed for the benchmark case are shown in Table 1. The parameters were chosen in a 
way such that if the yield were to be fixed at its expected value (which we fix at 
( ) 100E y = ), there would be no acres planted for the spot market in equilibrium; that is, 
processors would be fully contracted. To see this, suppose that processors offer a number 
of contracts such that they will not obtain enough input to work at capacity. Since there is 
no uncertainty, both farmers and processors know at planting time whether the spot price 
will be p  or 1r , given a positive expected aggregate spot acreage.
20 If the cash market 
price will be p , farmers will refuse to take any contract that offers 1r pδ+ < , leaving 
zero profits for processors who in turn will not want to offer those contracts (they would 
be better off by being fully contracted and not participating in a cash market). If the cash 
price will be 1r , individual farmers will not plant for that market, and expectations will 
not be confirmed. If, on the other hand, processors offer a number of contracts such that 
they will not need any extra input, expected aggregate spot acreage is zero, and farmers 
  
TABLE 1. Parameterization for the benchmark case 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
p 4 ym 200 
N 10 α 1.5 
M 5 β 1.5 
r1 1 d 100 
Q 5,000 b 10 
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know that the cash market price will be 1r , farmers will take the contracts and confirm 
expectations by not planting for the spot market. 
The problem for each processor reduces to the classical symmetric Cournot game 
with M  players. That is, ( ) ( )1max
ci
ciA
p r A E yδ− − , subject to ( ) ( ) ( )1 ' cjr E y C aδ+ ≥ , 
where ( )( )11 Mcj ciia N A== ∑ , 1,...,j N= . Using the cost function introduced in what 
follows, the solution is easily checked to be ( )( ) ( )* / 1cA N pE y d b M= − + . Plugging in 
the parameters from Table 1, we find that * 50cA = , implying that processors can work at 
capacity with the contracted acres (or that they are fully contracted). Note that the 
parameters presented in Table 1 are also consistent with the observation that producers 
will not plant for the spot market if they will obtain the commodity price with certainty.  
To solve the model, we need to assume a probability distribution for the random 
yield and a functional form for the farmers’ cost function. The probability distribution for 
the random yield is assumed to be a three-parameter beta distribution, commonly used to 
model yield risk (see Babcock and Hennessy 1996), which has the following density 
function: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
1
11
. −+
−− −
ΓΓ
+Γ= βα
βα
βα
βα
m
m
y
yyyyf , myy ≤≤0 . 
The parameters for the density function presented in Table 1 imply that ( ) 100E y = . 
We will assume that the functional form of the cost function is the following: 
( ) ( ) ( )2
2s c s c s c
bC a a d a a a a+ = + + + . 
The first term captures the factors of production that can be easily obtained to 
increase the area planted, whereas the quadratic term represents the increasing costs 
associated with less easily adjustable factors. An example of such a factor is the 
managerial capacity of the farmer. Note that an implication of the functional form 
assumed to describe farmers’ costs is that increasing the number of acres planted for the 
spot market increases the marginal costs of contract production, shifting contract supply 
to the left. That is, higher premiums will be needed to entice farmers to take a given 
number of contracts when they also plant for the spot market. This specification 
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effectively links the supply for contract and spot production. The structure of the model 
implies that in any co-existence equilibrium, expected marginal revenues for contract and 
spot acres are equalized (this is also true in Newbery 1998).   
Figure 1 shows aggregate best-response functions for farmers and processors. Since 
all processors are identical, the aggregate best-response function is obtained by 
multiplying the individual function by the number of processors. The same rule applies to 
the best-response function for farmers. 
The equilibrium for the model is where both curves intersect. The curve labeled as 
“processors” indicates the equilibrium aggregate number of contracts offered (and hence 
taken) in the game played between processors for every aggregate spot area. The curve 
labeled as “farmers” denotes the aggregate acreage planted for the spot market, consistent 
with any given contract offer by processors. Equilibrium for the model occurs, of course, 
where both curves intersect. At that point, the processors’ best-response functions 
intersect, and beliefs about aggregate spot acreage are confirmed.  
Note that the introduction of yield uncertainty results in a quite different equilibrium. 
Each processor reduced the number of contracts offered (from 50 to 27 acres), and room 
was created for production for the open market (39 acres in aggregate), as a complement 
to the contract market. Recognizing the presence of uncertainty as a fact of agricultural 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Farmer and processor best-response functions for the benchmark case 
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production yields a very different outcome than that in a deterministic model. In 
particular, co-existence of contract and spot production results in equilibrium.  
The intuition behind this result is simple. With uncertainty, the possibility of 
overbuying the input arises. The more contract acres are offered, the higher the likelihood 
that a fraction of the input cannot be processed and has to be sold at a loss at the ongoing 
commodity price. As processors offer fewer contracts, the probability that they will need 
additional input (and the amount needed) ex post to work at capacity increases, along 
with the expected spot price. 
Introduction of uncertainty benefits processors and harms farmers in this setting. 
Yield randomness allows processors to reduce the number of contracts offered (and hence 
the premiums needed to get farmers to accept the contracts) while creating an expected 
spot price that induces farmers to plant for the cash market. Profits for farmers decrease 
from $3,125 to $1,509, whereas processors’ profits increase from $2,500 to $3,826. 
Introduction of uncertainty allows processors to lower the contract premiums from 
* 2.5δ =  to * 1.74δ = , where the bar on *δ  indicates that yield is fixed.    
As mentioned before, there is a growing concern that spot markets are thinning and 
that farmers are more exposed to the market power of processors. The model presented 
allows us to comment on those concerns. Suppose for a moment that processors are 
effectively able to discourage production for the spot market.21 In that case, farmers can 
be enticed to take contracts offering lower premiums. This clearly benefits processors and 
harms farmers (profits now are predicted to be $4,048 and $1,382, respectively). 
However, this is not an equilibrium, if processors compete ex post as noted in the 
model.22 Although comforting, the previous argument points to the need for authorities to 
be vigilant concerning the behavior of spot buyers.23  
 
Equilibrium Responses to Changes in Economic Parameters 
In this section, we examine how changes in production uncertainty, the price of the 
processed good, the reference price, the number of processors, and the number of farmers 
affect the optimal choices of farmers and processors. The first variable we examine is 
production uncertainty. The effects of a mean-preserving spread in yields are illustrated 
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by solving the model for coefficients of variation (CV) of yields ranging from 0.1 to 1. 
The parameters of the yield distribution for the benchmark case represent a CV of 0.5. 
Figure 2a depicts the Nash equilibria for the model for the different amounts of yield 
uncertainty. As Figure 2a makes clear, increasing (decreasing) the level of production 
uncertainty confirms the reduction (increase) in the number of acres contracted. The same 
intuition holds. A mean-preserving spread in yield risk increases the expected excess 
supply of input, conditional on yields being high enough to cover all input demand. This 
effect tends to decrease contract acres because processors will want to reduce the amount 
of excess supply they have to sell at a loss. But, a mean-preserving spread in risk also 
increases the yield shortfall conditional on being low enough to generate positive ex post 
demand. However, processors know that if they marginally reduce their offer of contract 
acres, farmers will marginally increase their supply of spot acres. This substitution, which 
reduces the risk of a yield shortfall, is observed for low levels of yield uncertainty. As 
processors keep lowering their contract offers, farmers stop increasing their spot acreage. 
We speculate that this effect is due to a decrease in the premium offered with fewer 
contracts (see Figure 2b). Farmers’ expected marginal revenues from contracting 
decrease, and this slows the expansion in spot area. Recall that by the structure of the 
model, farmers’ expected marginal revenue in spot and contract production have to be 
equalized in equilibrium. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Effects of yield uncertainty (CV) on (a) equilibrium acres in contract and 
spot markets and (b) contract premium 
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Overall, an increase in yield uncertainty will tend to increase the relative importance 
of spot market activity, as processors try to avoid situations of excess supply from 
contracted acres. This suggests that spot markets will be more prevalent in situations 
where yield risk is relatively large.  
Figure 3 shows how output profitability (measured by the per-unit margin) affects 
the set of Nash equilibrium. Higher profit margins result in more contracts offered and 
less area planted for the spot market. This result is very intuitive for processors—higher 
margins imply less willingness to operate at less than capacity. However, this result is 
less obvious for farmers. For the farmer, there are two forces acting in opposite 
directions. On the one hand, increases in the output price result in a higher return in the 
spot market in the case in which processors have to bid their marginal valuation to get the 
input. On the other hand, this situation of excess demand is less likely to arise because of 
the reduced expected demand in the spot market. Figure 3 shows that the latter force 
dominates farmers’ decisions for low output price, but for higher prices the forces even 
out or the former force dominates slightly.  
When the output price is low enough, 2p = , the market for contracts disappear. 
Running at less than capacity is less expensive (in terms of foregone profits) for small 
margins. Also, adding premiums over the base price reduces the margin even further. 
Processors also recognize that if they decrease slightly the number of contracts offered,  
 
 
FIGURE 3. Effect of output price (p) on equilibrium acreage 
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farmers will increase their spot acreage, responding to stronger ex post demand 
expectations. 
Analogous results apply for changes in the commodity price. Increasing the 
reference price increases the expected spot price for any given contract acreage, 
providing incentives for farmers to plant more area for that market. Contracting becomes 
more expensive for processors, leading them to reduce the number of contracts offered. 
Figure 4 shows the effects of an increase in the number of processors, holding per-
processor demand constant. This situation simulates the effects of an increase in total 
demand for the input, holding the number of farmers constant. An increase in demand 
increases the probability that processors will have to purchase in the spot market, thereby 
raising the input price. Ceteris paribus, this induces processors to offer more contract 
acres, to avoid a fierce ex post competition with other buyers. However, the increased 
likelihood of a strong spot demand also induces farmers to increase the area planted for 
the spot market, which is illustrated in Figure 4. Additionally, with increasing marginal 
costs, it is more difficult for individual processors to find takers for any fixed number of 
contracts, as the number of processing firms in the market increases. The forces just 
described act to reduce the number of contract acres offered by individual processors,  
 
 
FIGURE 4. Equilibrium responses to changes in the number of processors (M) (per-
processor capacity held constant) (spot acres are per farmer; contract acres are per 
processor) 
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though this is not enough to reduce aggregate contract offers. As a whole, the processing 
industry offers more contracts as it becomes larger (for a given pool of farmers) in an 
attempt to reduce competition in the spot market. Thus, an increase in demand, holding 
the number of suppliers constant, results in more contract acres.24  
Similar results are found by holding total market demand constant but increasing the 
number of farmers. The effect of such an increase depends on the form of the farm-level 
marginal cost function. If marginal costs increase with output (as in our case), then an 
increase in the number of (identical) farmers will reduce the premium needed to entice 
farmers to take a fixed contract acreage as each farmer is offered fewer contracts. This 
creates an incentive for processors to expand the area procured under contract, which is 
what we observe in Figure 5. Also, for any given number of per-farm spot acres, supply for 
the cash market increases, leading to a lower expected price, which creates incentives for 
individual farmers to reduce speculative production. However, this reduction is not as 
strong as reduction of the aggregate spot area. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this study we develop a simple theoretical model that, suitably parameterized, 
allows for the co-existence of contracts and spot markets in agriculture. The presentation  
 
 
FIGURE 5. Equilibrium responses to changes in the number of farmers (spot acres 
are per farmer; contract acres are per processor) 
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here focused on the production of a specialty crop. However, suitable parameterizations 
would afford the study of a wide variety of agricultural production processes. Numerical 
simulations were conducted to study the impacts of fundamental economic factors on the 
equilibrium outcomes. Our results suggest that for a wide range of distinct parameters, 
participation in both markets constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the model. This result 
would indicate that the fact that a growing proportion of agricultural raw products are 
transacted by means other than cash markets does not necessarily imply that spot markets 
for these sectors will disappear altogether. There is a balance to be attained between the 
sizes of the markets. Because the model assumes that all the market participants are risk 
neutral, the equilibrium outcomes are the results of purely financial considerations.  
The predictions of the model make clear the substitutability between both systems of 
production (when the market structure remains unchanged). It is worth emphasizing, that 
co-existence of both markets only arose in the presence of uncertainty. For both 
specifications of the cash market supply function, specialization in contract markets is 
obtained absent uncertainty. This implies that because of its strong qualitative 
implications, uncertainty has to be explicitly accounted for in any modeling situation in 
which contracts and spot markets co-exist and production outcomes are subject to 
randomness. This is quite important in agriculture, for which biological uncertainty and 
weather variability (among other sources of randomness) play a major role.  
The model demonstrates the antagonistic interests of farmers and processors 
concerning the relative size of the spot and contract markets. With increasing marginal 
costs of contracting (affected by spot acreage), processors would prefer specialization in 
contracting. Farmers prefer the equilibrium predicted by the model (co-existence). The 
fact that processors would like to be able to discourage production for the spot market 
makes clear that safeguards should be established to ensure vigorous competition when 
cash markets arise. In the current setting, producers have the option of planting without a 
contract (and a spot market is likely to arise). This constrains the behavior of processors 
since contract offers have to provide sufficient financial inducement, relative to expected 
spot prices, to entice farmers to take them.  
The role of spot markets as a complement to contract production is illustrated. The 
term “complementing” is used here in the sense that the spot market serves as a residual 
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market in which buyers can make up for any difference in input needs, relative to their 
target procurement levels. Farmers can plant (speculatively) additional acres for spot 
markets at expected spot prices.  
Although the model presented here may not capture many aspects of contracting 
decisions in agriculture, it is a reasonable starting point. We discuss the basic elements 
and indicate points at which assumptions may yield different qualitative predictions. The 
model could be modified in several directions to tackle different complexities that 
commonly arise in the markets. Examples are the introduction of quality issues or 
transaction costs related to the contracted versus spot market procurement. A different 
direction in which this research could be extended is to explore the efficiency of the 
contract observed relative to other coordination mechanisms, and whether co-existence 
also attains for other contractual arrangements.  
 
  
Endnotes 
1. Some examples are hogs, corn, soybeans, wheat, and cattle. 
2.  For an example of a model where co-existence may result in equilibrium in a non-
agricultural setting, see Newbery 1998. This author models the British electricity 
market focusing on the use of contracts as entry-deterring devices.  
3. Within value-enhanced corn, average premiums were highest for white corn and 
lowest for hard endosperm varieties over the 1996-2001 period (Stewart 2003). 
4. For example, most specialty grain contracts use commodity prices as references. 
Good, Bender, and Lowell (2000) found that virtually all specialty grain handlers 
(corn and soybeans) in Illinois pay premiums based on cash or futures markets for 
commodities. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that they cannot manipulate the base 
price.    
5. This is also recognized by Weninger and Reinhorn (n.d.), and by Sexton and Zhang 
(1996). 
6. Note that we are not making any claim about the efficiency of this contract 
(observed) relative to other mechanisms. Incentives that shape the form of the 
contract (e.g., related to quality assurance) are taken as given and not modeled 
formally. 
7. We motivate the target amount of input to procure as given by the capacity 
constraint. However, that target could also be the result of the processor’s commit-
ments with downstream customers. For example, Good, Bender, and Lowell (2000) 
report that 66 percent of all firms handling white corn in Illinois contract with sellers 
based on acres, and 61 percent contract with buyers based on bushels. These 
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percentages are 80 percent and 48 percent for waxy corn, and 87 percent and 47 
percent for STS soybeans.   
8. Sexton (2000) discusses the fixed-proportions assumption in models of agricultural 
markets. 
9. This is consistent with the survey findings previously reported. 
10. The resulting demand is rectangular. Processors will demand sx  as long as the spot 
price does not exceed their marginal valuation of the input. 
11. This can be written as p P C= − , where P  denotes the output price (taken as given 
by the processor) and C  represents the per-unit processing costs. 
12.  One could argue that there is not much strategic interaction in this scenario and that 
simple supply and demand analysis would yield the same outcome, since it is 
optimal for a processor to bid the reservation price of farmers no matter what other 
processors do. However, we can also say that bidding 1r  is a dominant strategy for 
all processors and we can analyze all scenarios using the same framework. This 
situation would be representative of what happened in the 1999 crop year for white 
corn. A combination of higher-than-normal yields, combined with a substantial 
increase in the number of acres planted by speculators (or “wildcatters”), led to 
excess supply conditions (Boland et al. 1999).  
13. However, Sexton and Zhang’s approach differs in that they treated ex post supply 
and demand as being exogenous. 
14.  Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Tasnadi (1999), and Levitan and Shubik (1972) 
addressed this problem for capacity-constrained duopolists. Weninger and Reinhorn 
(n.d.), studying a more closely related problem (oligopsonists facing a fixed supply), 
concluded that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this problem exists if the number 
of buyers is sufficiently large and the price space is discrete. 
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15. The mixed strategy equilibrium for M=2 is presented in the Appendix. 
16. Here we are interpreting the supply function as giving the minimum price per unit at 
which firms are willing to sell any given quantity. 
17. This can be written as ( ) 1'( )( )s cci
C a aA r
E y
δ += − , with primes indicating first 
derivatives. 
18. These assumptions regarding the farmer’s problem closely follow Newbery 1998. 
Xia and Sexton (2004), stress the importance of considering rational agents on both 
sides of the market when modeling procurement of raw product inputs. 
19. Keep in mind that when reaction functions for farmers are mentioned, those are not 
“true” reaction functions. 
20. Note that there has to be excess demand in order for the spot market price to be 
between p  and 1r . This situation is ruled in the absence of uncertainty.   
21. Either they are able to commit not to buy or they collude implicitly not to bid 
aggressively on the open market.  
22. Though not presented, if the marginal costs of contract and spot production were 
independent, processors strictly prefer co-existence of the two markets. This result is 
driven by the fact that the spot market acts as a complement to the contract market 
without increasing the costs of contract production. 
23. Note also that processors’ profits decrease and farmers’ profits increase when spot 
markets are viable. This may provide yet another rationale for processors to integrate 
backwards into farm production, as has been observed, for example, in the hog 
industry. See, for example, Hennessy 1996, Murray 1995, and Perry 1978 for other 
rationales.  
24. Alternatively, if we increase the number of processors while holding aggregate 
capacity constant, the same pattern of reduction in contract offers by individual 
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processors is observed, without increasing aggregate contracted area. Actually, the 
total number of contracted acres declines slightly. This scenario simulates the effects 
of a decrease in the market power of processors, as each holds a smaller share of 
industry capacity (hence, their individual decisions have smaller marginal impacts). 
Growers also receive improved price premia in this setting, which is consistent with 
the findings of Elbehri and Paarlberg (2003).  
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Appendix 
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium for Scenario 3 (M=2) 
The argument presented here closely follows that of Levitan and Shubik (1972). A 
mixed-strategy equilibrium for this game is a pair of probability distributions over each 
player’s strategy space. These probability distributions must have the property that any 
strategy chosen by a player with positive probability must be optimal against the other 
player’s probability distribution.  
The amount that firm i  is able to procure as a function of both offered prices in 
general is 
 
( ) ( ){ }
( ){ }
min max( ,0),
2
min ,
s c c i j
s
si i j
c s i j
A y Q A y Q A y if r r
A yx if r r
Q A y A y if r r
 − − − <= = − >
. 
However, since this scenario arises when ( ) ( )
2
2s c s c
Q Qy
A A A A
≤ ≤+ + , or 
( ) ( )2c s cQ A y A y Q A y− ≤ ≤ − , and ( )c sQ A y x− = we can focus on the following case 
 
2
s s i j
s
si i j
s i j
A y x if r r
A yx if r r
x if r r
 − <= = >
. 
Since both prices will coincide with zero probability, the expected amount procured 
in the spot can be written as ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )1si j i s s j i sE x r A y x r xφ φ= − − + , and expected 
profits, ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) 1i j s s j sr p r r A y x r xπ φ φ= − − − + . The cumulative distribution 
function of player j is ( )j rφ . From this we obtain jφ  as 
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 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )2s s ij s s
A x p r r
r
p r A x
πφ − − −= − −  
with support [ ] [ ]1, ,r r p r⊆ . If processor i  is willing to randomize, it must be the case 
that iπ  is constant on [ ],r r . If firm i  offers r , it will be overbid with probability one. 
Since it will be the residual claimant for the input, it will be optimal to bid 1r  (if firm i  
knows it will be overbid, its payoff function is monotonically decreasing in the offer 
price, indicating that it is optimal to bid the reservation price of sellers). To pin down r  
we use the fact that ( ) ( ) ( )i i ir r rπ π π= = . It follows that ( )( ) ( )1s s sA y x p r x p r− − = − . 
Solving for r  we get  
 
( )( )1s s
s
A y x p r
r p
x
− −= −  
and  
( ) ( )( )( )( )1 2s sj s s
A y x r r
r
p r A y x
φ − −= − − . 
 
Second-Order Sufficient Conditions for the Processor’s Problem 
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, 
1,..., .i M=  
